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ABSTRACT
This paper presents new evidence on how corporate payout policy responds to the differential
between the tax burden on dividend income and that on accruing capital gains.  It describes the
construction of weighted average marginal tax rate series for the period since 1929, and it suggests
that the enactment of the Job Growth of Taxpayer Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 should raise
the after-tax value of dividends relative to capital gains by more than five percentage points.  The
impact of this change on payout depends on the elasticity of dividend payments with respect to the
after-tax value of dividend income relative to capital gains.  Time series estimates suggest an
elasticity of more than three, and imply that the recent tax reform could ultimately increase









  The Job Growth and Taxpayer Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) substantially 
reduced the individual income tax burden on dividends.  It also reduced tax rates on capital gains 
from the sale of corporate stock.  Before JGTRRA, an individual investor in the top federal income 
tax bracket received after-tax dividends equal to 61.5 percent of his pretax dividends.  After-tax 
capital gains, by comparison, were at least 80 percent of the pretax gain.  Tax deferral and the 
prospect of basis step-up at death could generate an effective capital gains tax rate below the 
statutory rate of 20 percent.  The ratio of the after-tax income from dividends and to the after-tax 
income from capital gains for a top tax rate investor, assuming a 20 percent capital gains tax rate, 
was 0.769.  JGTRRA raised this ratio to 1.00.  Proponents of dividend tax relief argue that lowering 
the dividend tax will raise corporate dividend payout by reducing the tax cost of paying dividends 
and that it will reduce the corporate cost of capital, thereby encouraging investment.   
This paper explores the potential impact of JGTRRA on corporate payout behavior by 
examining the historical relationship between the relative tax burden on dividends and capital gains 
and the share of corporate earnings that is distributed as cash dividends.  It also considers actual 
changes in payout behavior since JGTRRA was enacted, and discusses the interaction between 
payout decisions and investment decisions.  
I.   Measuring the Tax Burden on Dividends and Capital Gains 
The standard approach to measuring the relative tax burden on dividends and capital gains 
assumes that each investor’s tax parameters affect the aggregate tax preference for dividends versus 
capital gains in proportion to the investor’s ownership of corporate stock.  If τ div,h and τ cg,h denote the 
marginal tax rates on dividends and long-term capital gains, respectively, for investor h, then the 
aggregate dividend tax preference parameter is  
(1)        θ t = Σ  wh,t*[(1-τ div,h,t)/(1-τ cg,h,t)] 
where wh,t indicates the share of corporate stock owned at time t by investor h.     2
  Equation (1) focuses on the tax burdens that investors face on dividends and capital gains.  
While those are usually the only taxes that distinguish between different components of equity 
returns, in 1936 and 1937, corporations were taxed at different rates on distributed and undistributed 
earnings.  For those years, the corporate tax preference parameter is θ c,t = (1-τ c,div,t)/(1-τ c,retentions,t). 
  Table 1 reports wh,t, the share of corporate equity owned by households in taxable accounts, 
along with τ div,h,t, the weighted average marginal tax rate on dividends received by the household 
sector, and θ t, the aggregate tax preference parameter.  The first column shows the household equity 
ownership share.  Equity held through both defined benefit and defined contribution pension plans is 
excluded from the measure of taxable household ownership, while equity held by mutual funds is 
included in proportion to the household sector’s ownership of such funds.  Taxable household stock 
holdings accounted for over 80 percent of outstanding corporate stock in the late 1960s, but declined 
to roughly sixty percent by the late 1980s.  In 2002, taxable households owned 57 percent of 
corporate stock.  The entry for 2003 is an estimate; it equals the 2002 value. 
  The second column of Table 1 shows the weighted average marginal tax rate on dividends 
received by taxable households.  The estimates are based on data from the NBER TAXSIM model 
for the period since 1960, with earlier years tabulated from published income tax returns from 
Statistics of Income volumes.  The entries reflect the combined federal as well as state marginal 
income tax rate, recognizing potential federal income tax deductibility of state income taxes.  Thus 
the estimated marginal tax rate for 2003 is 17 percent, with most households facing a 15 percent 
marginal federal tax rate.  The table shows that the weighted average marginal tax rate rose in the late 
1990s and then declined by roughly two percentage points between 1999 and 2002.  The estimates 
for 2001 and 2002 include the 2001 (EGTRRA) tax law changes. 
  The estimate for 2003 incorporates the JGTRRA changes.  It caps the ordinary federal 
income tax rate on dividend income at 15 percent and also limits the statutory tax rate on long-term 
capital gains to this value.  Some taxpayers who face the Alternative Minimum Tax may face higher   3
tax rates.    JGTRRA is predicted to reduce the weighted average marginal tax rate on dividend 
income by 11.9 percentage points.   
  The last column of Table 1 shows the aggregate investor tax preference for dividends versus 
capital gains.  This data series captures the impact of both falling marginal tax rates on households as 
well as shifting ownership patterns.  The calculations follow Poterba (1987) in assuming that the 
effective capital gains tax rate is only 0.25 times the statutory rate, as a result of gain deferral and the 
opportunity to step up basis at death.  The entries in the last column of Table 1 show that there has 
been a long-term increase in the after-tax value of dividends relative to capital gains.  In 1960 this 
ratio was 0.659.  In 1970 it was 0.72, and by 1985 it had increased to 0.824.  In 2002 it was 0.863.   
  The JGTRRA-induced reduction in the weighted-average household marginal tax rate on 
dividend income translates into a 6.7 percentage point increase in θ.  This weighted-average tax 
preference across all investors changes by less than the change in the weighted-average household 
marginal dividend tax rate because households account for only 57 percent of equity holdings in 
2002 and because the 2003 reform also changed capital gains tax rates.   
II. Tax Incentives and Aggregate Payout Behavior 
To study how the weighted average tax preference parameter defined in (1) affects aggregate 
dividend payments, I use annual data from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) to 
estimate an aggregate time-series model for corporate dividends.  The model, in the tradition of John 
Lintner (1956), relates the annual change in real dividends, ∆ ln Dt, to the current change in corporate 
profits (∆ ln Profitt) and the relative tax burden on dividends versus capital gains (∆ ln θ t), as well as to 
lagged levels of dividends, profits, and the relative tax burden.  
(2)    ∆ ln Dt = β 0 + β 1*∆ ln Profitt + β 2*∆ ln θ t  + β 3*∆ ln θ corp,t + β 4*ln Dt-1 + β 5*ln Profitt-1  
+ β 6*ln θ t-1 + β 7*ln θ corp,t-1 + ε t. 
The long-run elasticity of dividend payout with respect to the tax preference measure (θ) is -β 6/β 4.     4
  NIPA data are available in a consistent format beginning in 1929, but corporate profits are 
negative for several years in the early 1930s. To avoid the problems this raises for a log-log 
specification relating dividends and profits, my estimation sample begins in 1935.  I estimate 
equation (2) using NIPA corporate profits with capital consumption and inventory valuation 
adjustment for 1935-2002.  The estimating equation includes indicator variables for the World War II 
years, 1942-1945, since dividends were controlled by government regulation and likely follow a 
different dynamic in this period than in others.  I do not report the coefficients on these variables, or 
on an indicator variable for the early 1970s dividend control period.  The resulting estimates are: 
(3)   ∆ ln Dt = 0.090 + 0.114*∆ ln profitt - 0.064*∆ ln θ t  + 4.283*∆ ln θ corp,t – 0.137*ln Dt-1  
     (0.044) (0.061)                   (0.420)             (0.465)                   (0.056) 
 
  +  0.103*ln  profitt-1 + 0.440*ln θ t-1 + 0.419*ln θ corp,t-1  
      (0.043)                   (0.179)             (0.530)                
 
The R
2 for this equation is 0.730.  The estimated coefficients imply a long-run dividend elasticity 
with respect to profits of 0.75.  One cannot reject the null hypothesis that this elasticity is unity.   
The estimates suggest that the relative tax burden on dividends and on capital gains affects 
the share of earnings that is distributed as dividends.  While short-run changes in θ have a small and 
statistically insignificantly effect on aggregate dividends, the long run elasticity of dividends with 
respect to θ  is 3.2. This elasticity is substantially larger than my (1987) estimate using data spanning 
1935-1985, a finding that is somewhat surprising given the growth of share repurchases and other 
non-dividend forms of cash distributions during the last two decades. 
Finding the confidence interval for the long-run elasticity is an econometric challenge, since 
the elasticity is the ratio of two coefficients, -β 6/β 4, and β 4 can take values close to zero.  I estimated 
the confidence interval using a bootstrap algorithm.  For each boostrap iteration, I resampled data, 
with replacement, from the 1935-2002 sample, re-estimated the parameters β 4 and β 6, and computed 
the long-run elasticity -β 6/β 4.  The interval that includes 95 percent of the resulting elasticity   5
estimates, with 2.5 percent above and 2.5 percent below, is [1.14, 7.76].  Thus the estimates suggest a 
positive elasticity of dividends with respect to dividend taxes, but with a limited precision.   
The estimates in equation (3) can be used to evaluate the long-run effect of JGTRRA on 
dividend payout. Recall that JGTRRA is predicted to raise θ  from 0.863 to 0.930.  This translates 
into a change of 0.075 in ln θ , which would raise the long-run level of dividends by 24 percent if the 
payout elasticity is 3.2.  The U.S. corporate sector paid dividends of $359 billion in 2002, so a 24 
percent increase in payout would result in a $86 billion increase in dividends.  The model predicts 
that this adjustment would occur slowly.  With β 2 = 0, the elasticity of dividends with respect to taxes 
in the year after the dividend tax reform is β 6, the elasticity in the second year is β 6 + (1+β 4)*β 6, the 
effect in the third year is β 6*[1 + (1+β 6) + (1+β 6)
2], etc. Even three years after a tax change, just over 
one quarter of the long-run effect on dividend payout will have occurred. 
  Media accounts of corporate dividend policy in the months since passage of JGTRRA have 
emphasized the decisions by several large firms, such as Microsoft, to initiate or increase their 
dividend payment.  Jennifer Blouin, Jana Raedy, and Douglas Shackelford (2004) report that 
dividend payments increased in the quarter after JGTRRA was enacted.  Data on dividend changes 
by firms in the Standard and Poors’ 500 confirm this finding.  During 2003, the “net dividend 
increase” percentage, defined as (number of firms increasing dividends – number of firms reducing 
dividends)/500, was 38.7 percent.  This contrasts with 29.8 percent for 2002 and 30.2 percent in 
2001.  It is difficult to draw strong conclusions from this time series evidence, however, because 
2001 and 2002 witnessed many fewer dividend increases than past years.  The “net increaser 
percentage” for 2000, for example, was 39.4 percent, and in 1999 it was 43 percent.  Further work is 
needed to control for earnings shocks that may have affected payout and to disentangle long-term 
trend effects from the short-run effects in 2003.   
III.  Dividends, Investment, and Share Prices   6
  Supporters of JGTRRA argued that reducing the dividend tax would encourage corporate 
investment.  Robert Carroll, Kevin Hassett, and James Mackie (2003) and Jane Gravelle (2003) offer 
detailed analyses of the bill’s potential impact on investment under various assumptions about 
corporate financial behavior.  The foregoing results suggest that JGTRRA will increase corporate 
dividends.  Some might claim that this finding is inconsistent with a favorable investment impact, 
since higher dividend payouts would reduce the firm’s retained earnings and hence the funds 
available for investment.  Yet analysis of the corporate cash flow identity  
(4)    After-Tax Profits + Net New Share Issues = Dividends + Investment 
shows that this need not be the case.  Dividends and investment could both increase, even if after-tax 
profits were constant, if firms reduced their use of share repurchases or increased their new share 
issues.   
  The effect of dividend taxation on corporate investment is controversial.  Alan Auerbach 
(2002) summarizes the literature to date and carefully delineates the assumptions that are required for 
dividend tax relief to increase corporate investment.  The finding that dividends respond to changes 
in the relative tax burden on dividends and capital gains is consistent with the “traditional” view of 
dividend taxation, explained in Poterba and Lawrence Summers (1984).  The model underlying this 
view implies that cutting dividend taxes reduces the corporate cost of capital, and therefore leads to a 
higher level of investment.  Lower dividend taxes reduce the tax burden on taxable investors who 
purchase new equity issues in expectation of future dividend payouts.   The aggregate evidence does 
not address potential differences across firms.  Auerbach and Kevin Hassett (2003) point out that 
there is likely to be substantial heterogeneity across firms, with only some firms responding to 
dividend taxes as the traditional view suggests.   
  By reducing the tax burden on future dividends, JGTRRA should also increase stock prices.  
To quantify the law’s impact, one needs to forecast future investment, the future capital stock, and 
future corporate dividends.  A crude, but probably informative, estimate of this impact can be   7
computed by capitalizing the annual flow of foregone dividend taxes.  The U. S. Congressional 
Budget Office (2004) estimates that the dividend and capital gains tax provisions of JGTRRA will 
reduce federal income tax revenues by $23 billion in 2004, and by larger amounts in future years.  
This revenue stream can be capitalized using a price-earnings ratio such as that for the S&P 500, 
which was approximately thirty in the first two quarters of 2003.  The implied increase in stock 
market value, $690 billion, represents roughly six percent of the $11.4 trillion aggregate value of 
U.S. equities at the end of March 2003.     8
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Table 1: Investor Tax Preference for Dividends versus Capital Gains, 1929-2003 
Year  Share of Equity 
Owned by Households 
Weighted Average Household 
Marginal Tax Rate on Dividends  
Weighted Average 
Investor Tax Price (θ) 
1929 0.915  0.104  0.918 
1930 0.914  0.092  0.928 
1931 0.913  0.079  0.939 
1932 0.911  0.158  0.874 
1933 0.910  0.161  0.872 
1934 0.909  0.208  0.833 
1935 0.908  0.218  0.825 
1936 0.907  0.282  0.838 
1937 0.906  0.280  0.846 
1938 0.905  0.212  0.831 
1939 0.903  0.233  0.814 
1940 0.904  0.282  0.773 
1941 0.904  0.350  0.714 
1942 0.904  0.461  0.616 
1943 0.904  0.521  0.562 
1944 0.904  0.438  0.636 
1945 0.899  0.454  0.625 
1946 0.896  0.459  0.622 
1947 0.894  0.469  0.614 
1948 0.891  0.411  0.667 
1949 0.887  0.388  0.688 
1950 0.887  0.418  0.662 
1951 0.888  0.454  0.629 
1952 0.882  0.470  0.618 
1953 0.876  0.449  0.639 
1954 0.877  0.438  0.648 
1955 0.872  0.446  0.643 
1956 0.874  0.444  0.644 
1957 0.868  0.434  0.655 
1958 0.867  0.431  0.658 
1959 0.864  0.428  0.661 
1960 0.859  0.432  0.659 
1961 0.855  0.430  0.663 
1962 0.855  0.427  0.665 
1963 0.847  0.415  0.679 
1964 0.844  0.403  0.690 
1965 0.842  0.392  0.700 
1966 0.835  0.382  0.710 
1967 0.833  0.385  0.708 
1968 0.833  0.423  0.677 
1969 0.815  0.421  0.700 
1970 0.802  0.402  0.720 
1971 0.786  0.382  0.742 
1972 0.782  0.388  0.738   10
1973 0.759  0.399  0.739 
1974 0.727  0.403  0.748 
1975 0.718  0.387  0.762 
1976 0.729  0.421  0.734 
1977 0.707  0.431  0.736 
1978 0.683  0.437  0.741 
1979 0.689  0.430  0.732 
1980 0.688  0.433  0.730 
1981 0.670  0.416  0.748 
1982 0.639  0.352  0.800 
1983 0.617  0.346  0.811 
1984 0.598  0.339  0.821 
1985 0.582  0.343  0.824 
1986 0.613  0.322  0.826 
1987 0.604  0.291  0.861 
1988 0.630  0.264  0.874 
1989 0.628  0.266  0.873 
1990 0.616  0.265  0.876 
1991 0.626  0.269  0.871 
1992 0.628  0.269  0.871 
1993 0.620  0.287  0.860 
1994 0.606  0.291  0.862 
1995 0.608  0.296  0.858 
1996 0.609  0.295  0.859 
1997 0.616  0.305  0.846 
1998 0.610  0.306  0.842 
1999 0.630  0.310  0.834 
2000 0.605  0.298  0.847 
2001 0.590  0.297  0.852 
2002 0.571  0.289  0.863 
2003 0.571    0.170  0.930 
Source:  Column 1 is based on data from the Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds Accounts.  
Column 2 is based on tabulations from the NBER TAXSIM model for years after 1960, and on data 
from published Statistics of Income volumes for earlier years.  The tax rate includes the federal 
marginal income tax rate plus an estimate of the state marginal income tax rate, net of federal income 
tax deductibility.  Column 3 is a weighted average of tax burdens on various investor categories, as 
described in the text. 
 
 